Ideological Synesthesia When we no longer see democracy, but "feel" it
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Synesthesia is a neurological phenomenon: the distinct channels of perception become mixed. Some see sounds as colors, while others perceive tastes as tangible shapes. The point is not that this is a "mistake," but that for the person involved, this is how reality is perceived. It is futile to explain to them that a sound cannot be blue or bitter – they perceive it that way. In contemporary political thought, a precisely similar phenomenon has emerged regarding the concept of democracy. The method of decision-making and the content of the decision – democracy and ideologies – have not merely mixed, but have melded at the perceptual level.
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The democratic procedure has taken on a "color," specifically an ideological color. For instance, if a decision is not liberal, political perception automatically sees it as "undemocratic" – even if every formal condition of the procedure was met. This ideological synesthesia is not malice, nor necessarily manipulation, but a cognitive distortion. And that is precisely why it is particularly dangerous: it makes clear conceptual thinking impossible. Yet democracy – despite all its historical, moral, and emotional baggage – is not a worldview, not a value system, and not a promise of "good" decisions. Democracy is a procedure. Technically, it either exists or it does not. It is a binary concept: it is either present or absent – regardless of the ideological direction in which the election leads.
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Democracy as a Procedure – Schumpeter’s Thesis Joseph Schumpeter’s classical definition remains one of the clearest starting points to this day. For him, democracy is not the metaphysical expression of the "will of the people," but an institutionalized competition for political power, in which leaders acquire a mandate through free elections. This procedural view consciously strips democracy of all moral romanticism. It examines not what people decide, but how. For Schumpeter, democracy does not guarantee wise decisions, does not rule out bad governance, and does not ensure moral superiority. Yet, it remains a democracy as long as the procedure functions. This realization is particularly uncomfortable today because it means: a democratic decision can be debatable, flawed, or ideologically rejected – and still be democratic.
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Dahl and the Minimum Conditions Robert Dahl’s polyarchy theory further refines this image. He describes not an ideal democracy, but minimum criteria without which it is meaningless to speak of democracy. These include genuine political competition, the possibility to choose between alternatives, access to information, and the peaceful transfer of power. Dahl, too, does not claim that democracy produces good decisions. Only that it produces decisions in a verifiable way. If these conditions are violated, democracy ceases to exist – regardless of whether elections are formally held.
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Sartori and the Loss of Conceptual Discipline Giovanni Sartori warned decades ago about the dilution of the concept of democracy. When every system calls itself democratic, the concept loses its exclusionary power. According to him, democracy becomes useless when applied to everything; if every political system calls itself democratic, the definition loses its defining boundaries. Sartori specifically warned against trying to "save" democracy with adjectives, because these adjectives often do not clarify, but rather obscure. This warning leads directly to the problem of "illiberal democracy".
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"Illiberal Democracy" as a Conceptual and Political Scam At first glance, the term "illiberal democracy" seems like a clarification: democracy, but not liberal. In practice, however, it conflates two different phenomena. On one hand, the rejection of liberalism – which is a legitimate ideological stance. On the other hand, the dismantling or distortion of democratic procedures – which is not. In today’s political usage, "illiberal democracy" often does not mean that the majority chose a non-liberal policy, but that authoritarian exercise of power is hiding behind democratic scenery. Elections in such cases are not tools for decision-making, but rituals of legitimation. This is the real deception.
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When the Election No Longer Decides Democracy ceases to exist where political competition is not real, where institutions skew in one direction, where the removability of power becomes formal, and where rules are not neutral but predetermine the result. In such cases, we are speaking not of "illiberal democracy," but of an authoritarian system – even if elections are held. The election here is not a tool for decision, but a tool for concealing the decision.
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The Misleading Nature of the Word "Illiberal" The term "illiberal" is imprecise in itself. It can mean communitarianism, conservatism, prioritizing religious norms, or a critique of individualist liberalism. These are all legitimate political positions in a democracy. The problem begins when the "illiberal" adjective masks authoritarian power-technical steps and disguises procedural restrictions as an ideological debate.
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Conclusion: Resolving the Synesthesia Democracy is not a promise of good decisions, but a procedure for producing decisions. Technically, it exists or it does not. If the election process is genuine, democracy exists – regardless of the ideological outcome. If the process is distorted, democracy does not exist – even if elections are held. Ideological synesthesia will continue to distort political thinking until we are willing to "separate the senses" again: the method of decision from the content of the decision. It is not democracy that is in crisis, but our ability to recognize when it exists – and when it does not.
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Supplement: Interest Recognition, Interest Assertion, and the Social Conditions of Democracy The procedural, binary concept of democracy is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for its survival. Even if the electoral mechanism functions formally, the social content of democracy depends on whether social groups are capable of recognizing and asserting their own interests. At this point, another rarely discussed fault line becomes visible.
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In modern mass societies, the overwhelming majority of people do not make decisions based on structured interests, but based on short-term, direct benefits, emotional impulses, and symbolic identifications. "Interest" is not a conscious category, but often a retrospective rationalization. The choice here is not a deliberation of long-term social positions, but a momentary profit–loss experience. This in itself is not a "democracy error." Democracy – in Schumpeter’s sense – does not require rational voters, only procedural participation. The problem arises when this deficit in interest recognition becomes permanent, and the political space is built entirely on managing immediate rewards and fears. In such cases, democracy formally exists, but its self-correcting capability weakens.
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The other – even more severe – problem appears when certain social groups would be capable of recognizing their own structural interests but do not possess the channels necessary to assert them. This is particularly characteristic of systems where democracy has been institutionally hollowed out: the election takes place, but the distribution of decision-making weight is heavily distorted. In such cases, a double trap emerges: a part of society does not know what it should want, while the other part would know, but cannot want it in a politically effective way. This state is extremely unstable. Democracy here no longer mediates interests but simulates their appearance. The election happens, but it does not change power dynamics. This is the point where authoritarian power techniques and hollowed-out democracy meet: the procedure survives, but the social content vanishes from behind it.
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It is important to emphasize: this is not identical to the "stupidity" of voters, nor is it merely an educational problem. It is a structural question. The capability for interest recognition and assertion requires an institutional environment, pluralism, genuine competition, and access to information. If these are missing, democracy may formally exist, but it does not function socially. In this sense, maintaining democracy is not just a procedural question, but a collective learning process. It does not guarantee that society decides well – but it gives the opportunity to learn from bad decisions. When this opportunity ceases, democracy does not collapse overnight, but slowly loses its meaning.